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There has been considerable analysis of the measures put in place to 
deal with the pandemic. The human and economic costs for most 
countries have hugely surpassed early forecasts.  And even those 
countries that started lockdowns early have had to inject massive 
amounts of liquidity into the markets and borrow at levels not seen 
since the Second World War, backed by what was effectively the 
‘printing’ of money by the central banks, otherwise known as 
Quantitative Easing (QE). The estimates are that by the end of 2020 
the world had already spent some $11US trillion dealing with the 
impact of the pandemic.     
According to a report by the World Economic Forum last autumn, if 
there had been proper investment to prepare for this pandemic (as 
indeed there must be from here on), then the overall cost could have 
been kept to just $39US billion.[i] That actual spend of course will 
increase further – according to the same report – by a further $10 
UStr as a new wave of infections has hit the UK and many other parts 
of the world with greater intensity than before, necessitating new 
measures to constrain the spread of the disease. 
Where has the money been spent? 
A lot of this extra borrowing has been directed to health services – 
with some of the money allocated by national governments but also 
with additional  support for individual countries from regional and 
multilateral organisations like the EU, the World Bank and the IMF. 
Developing countries in particular have been able to access 
emergency debt relief and loans, often without usual extra conditions 
being imposed. 
But such extra spending has not only been spent on 
health.  Considerable sums of money have been allocated to 
providing direct stimulus for the economies to ease the burden of 
lockdowns on businesses, workers and consumers which 
would  otherwise have meant  a catastrophic fall in incomes and 
wealth. Indeed the international institutions are encouraging countries 
to continue with stimulus measures and not withdraw them too soon. 
Why it is so different this time? 
Since the middle of the last century recessions had tended to be 
caused by credit crunches and sharp rises in interest rates following 
borrowing excesses in preceding years. Think of regulatory failures as 
in the financial crisis of 2008/9, or supply shocks as in the various oil 
crises of the 1970s. This time the economic fallout has been the direct 
result of measures taken by the authorities to pretty much ‘slam the 
brakes on’ and close down both supply and demand in their 
economies, at least for a while, to deal with a health crisis.[ii] 
The impact has been as significant as it has been unpredictable. In 
many countries, like in the UK, while just half of the economy has 
continued to operate, there have been some parts of the economy 
that have in fact expanded – such as IT services which have been in 
great demand as people started working from home, health and of 
course the public sector which has had to expand to deal with the 
pressures of the pandemic. 
There have been some real winners – think of digital platforms 
like Amazon and ebay, supermarket deliveries, distribution, FinTec 
and so on. Manufacturing and construction took an immediate hit but 
have been in positive territory since they were allowed to reopen in 
June. But there have also been some real losers – transport, retail 
generally (except online), hospitality, the creative sector and leisure 
and tourism amongst them. 
The UK takes a big hit 
The UK has been particularly badly hit in both health and economic 
terms.[iii] With  services making up up some 80% of GDP and with 
many service sectors particularly badly affected as face to face 
contact had to be restricted,  this has required  a massive mobilisation 
of support on a scale. In  year one of the pandemic has far exceeded 
the fiscal response to the financial crisis of 2008/9. The sharp fall in 
the economy in the second quarter of 2020,  after a modest decline in 
the first, was thought at the time by the likes of the Bank of England to 
have been the nadir of what it was hoped would be a V-shaped 
recovery, with things returning to normal pretty quickly. This hasn’t 
happened, as many of us warned. Yes there was a sharp rebound in 
the summer months with a 15.8% rise in Quarter 3 – in itself a record. 
But by September this recovery was already fizzling out and by 
November 2020 the economy was once again registering monthly 
falls due to  new lockdowns which have been in place more or less 
continuously since. 
This looks therefore more like the W-shaped recovery some of us 
warned about after all.  Overall, GDP is likely to have fallen by some 
11% in 2020 and the economy at end-year remained around 8-9% 
below pre-Covid levels. Although some recovery is expected after a 
likely further decline in GDP in the first quarter of this year, the 
prospect of continued restrictions of some sort despite widespread 
vaccination programmes suggests that growth may not be much more 
than 5-6% overall in 2021. This means that we won’t get back to 
where we were at end of 2019 before, at best, the middle and more 
likely the end of 2022. There is a long road to recovery ahead. 
The fiscal cost 
On the fiscal side this has meant that government finances in the 
autumn were showing sharp deteriorations with deep cuts year-on-
year in VAT receipts, partly reflecting a cut in the rate from 20% to 5% 
for the hospitality and tourism sectors, reduced receipts from 
corporation tax, income tax, fuel duty and airport tax, as well as lower 
stamp duty receipts as a result of the temporary abolition of stamp 
duty for houses costing below £500,000. 
Higher welfare payments as output and jobs contracted also then 
resulted in spending being markedly higher. As a result of the sharp 
contraction in the economy , those ‘automatic fiscal stabilisers’ in the 
UK are likely to have accounted for nearly £100b of what may end up 
being total borrowing of just under £400b for the financial year as a 
whole, ending in early April according to the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) estimate in late November[iv]. 
But there have also been direct stimulus measures such as tax 
breaks, business rate holidays, government backed Coronavirus 
Business Interruption Loans (CIBLs)[v]and Bounce Back loans 
(BBLs)[vi] for UK based SMEs with a turnover of up to £45m, as well 
as a loans scheme  for larger enterprises. [vii] This has been 
alongside direct employment and income support as well as grants for 
small firms in retail that had to close. We have also seen extra 
targeted support to sectors that had have particularly suffered such as 
the creative industries, sport and charities which have been 
particularly badly hit, as well as a temporary increase in Universal 
Credit (this is due to end but at the time of writing there is mounting 
pressure to extend this support). Gaps remain, especially in terms of 
support actually managing to reach small firms that need it.[viii] 
Furlough costs 
More significantly in terms of the public purse is the cost of the 
furlough scheme introduced by the UK alongside many other 
countries in Europe and also Australia and New Zealand. This 
supports employers to keep workers on their books with the 
government paying at the start 80% of pay up to a limit of £2,500 if 
they didn’t work due to closures or lack of demand. Some 9.5m 
employees were supported in this way during the first lockdown and 
some 2.5m self-employed got extra help. Attempts to reduce the rate 
and make businesses pay more of a share were quickly abandoned in 
early autumn  when the economic situation deteriorated again and the 
original terms were re-introduced in November and now extended to 
end April 2021 – and will likely be extended again.  The cost this 
financial year is estimated at just under £90b. 
How much worse will it get? 
There are undoubtedly clear gaps in the support offered so far with 
many disadvantaged groups complaining, in the main correctly, that 
they have been left out. The type of unusual recession we have been 
experiencing in the UK has left the young, the recent entrepreneurs, 
women and all whose work tasks cannot easily be done from work 
disproportionately shouldering job losses. Unemployment has risen 
from 3.9% to 5% but this is flattered by the still large number of people 
on furlough – probably around some 4m. The underlying rate is more 
like 6.5% and could rise further at the end of furlough. Government 
finances will not therefore improve in a hurry despite the supposed 
£100b saved by individuals during the pandemic which is waiting to be 
spent as the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, Andy Haldane 
has been arguing[ix]. With the economy therefore recovering but not 
exactly bouncing back, the deficit to GDP ratio won’t fall as fast as 
hoped from the likely 20% it will reach this year.  And there will need 
to be more borrowing every year until the end of the current 
parliament with the OBR estimating that we will still be borrowing 
some £100b to plug the gap between revenue and spending in 2024-
25. And the debt to GDP ratio will rise further from just under 100% of 




The markets are happy to finance increasing debt levels at present, 
with interest rates across the world at record lows as the chart above 
indicates. At times countries, even heavily indebted ones, have been 
able to borrow at negative rates at year end 2020. The willingness of 
central banks to step in and support by buying government bonds in 
the secondary market has been particularly helpful. That may of 
course not last. The sums have been huge and at some point the 
markets may take fright. But we are not at that point now. 
So far so good. But how the money has been spent and on whom has 
come under increasing scrutiny. Yes, some larger firms that did well, 
such as supermarkets that have seen sharp rises in turnover and 
profits so they have returned the business rates relief and repaid 
furlough money. But there have been concerns that some of the 
furlough money or borrowings through the guaranteed loan schemes 
may have been fraudulently claimed and /or misused. A report in 
December suggested that the taxpayer may be due to cover losses 
through fraudulent use of some £26b from the Bounceback loan 
scheme alone, in addition to the likely losses if some companies do 
not survive. [i]   
A range of issues are making the news relating to £10b extra paid for 
PPE because of ill preparedness by the government according to the 
National Audit Office[ii], botched PPE purchases, some £150m 
wasted on out of date masks[iii], a track and trace app that was 
abandoned after costing £15b, and contracts of some £10b being 
awarded without proper competition to friends of politicians. In a crisis 
mistakes can and will be made, and can also most of the time be 
excused. But as the spending continues with the crisis being 
prolonged and restrictions still biting, worries about the lack of proper 
scrutiny during the early part of the crisis and since are now rising up 
the political and economic agenda. 
A Race, but not between Health and Wealth 
The government has said that we are now in a ‘race’ to vaccinate as 
quickly as possible against a virus that is mutating into more 
dangerous forms. How successful we are in this race will determine 
whether we will be able to soon live with Covid in society and reopen 
the economy and lead (fairly) normal lives, as against extended lock 
downs and a much greater economic hit to GDP and the government 
finances.  There is not a simple health-economy trade-off as some 
suggest.  Rather, getting the virus under control is key not only to 



























This Long Read draws on and develops a chapter by the authors in 
the new volume ‘The Pandemic. A Year of Mistakes’ edited by John 
Mair and available from Bite-Size Books. 
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